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The title of the Symposium that generated these articles,
"Mission Impossible?: The Compatibility of Military and Environmental
Goals," enticed attendees to witness a train wreck-like clash of ideals.
Environmentalists, frustrated by what they see as the military's poor
environmental record, would have a chance to blast their foes. Represen-
tatives from the Air Force, Army, and Navy would respond by touting
their improvements in complying with environmental laws, and their
initiatives to become more green, such as increasing use of renewable fuels
in aircraft fleets. The day promised to be as entertaining as roller derby,
or for a more contemporary audience, ultimate fighting.
The two panels before ours did not disappoint. Thomas Ledvina,
the U.S. Navy's Associate General Counsel for Litigation, and Joel
Reynolds, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, offered sharply
contrasting perspectives on the Navy's use of sonar and its impact on
marine mammals. Professor Robert Percival's presentation on "American
Exceptionalism" took the military to task for crafting out exceptions for
itself from environmental laws, and Professor Marcilynn Burke high-
lighted the need to protect national treasures from military encroachment.
And then Carolyn White and I stepped up to the plate. Of all the
day's panels, ours was perhaps the one that most demonstrated that
military and civilian environmental goals can be compatible. Indeed, we
found ourselves in a harmonious position, which made for little debate
and few questions from an audience primed from the morning's panels
to expect confrontation. That was no accident. The Base Realignment
and Closure ("BRAC") process was a major focus of Ms. White's presenta-
tion on environmental issues, involving a wide variety of military real
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank the
participants and attendees at the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review's Symposium, "Mission Impossible?: The Compatibility of Military and
Environmental Goals," the editors of the Environmental Law and Policy Review, Carolyn
White for her assistance and helpful suggestions, and Clay Burns for research assistance.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
property transactions (not just those in BRAC), and the central theme of
mine. Ms. White and I have studied BRAC from somewhat different
perspectives. I have looked at BRAC from an academic, theoretical per-
spective, comparing BRAC's environmental features to those of state and
federal brownfields programs and incentives. Ms. White has extensive
transactional expertise involving military real estate, including frontline
responsibilities in the BRAC program.
Both of us suggested strongly that lessons learned from the BRAC
process over the past decade turn out to be surprisingly useful not only
in assessing how the military should remediate sites before transferring
them, but also in discussing how the private sector should remediate and
reuse real property. This broad agreement between us about BRAC's
features and track record made for a comfortable Saturday afternoon, of
course. But it led to an even more positive outcome.
In the symposium presentations, Q&A sessions, and discussions
afterwards, I found a common ground in our different but complementary
approaches to environmental issues in property remediation and reuse.
Specifically, I found that the BRAC process, far from being inattentive
to environmental concerns in the process of closing surplus bases and
transferring them to the private sector, has three "surprises," some of which
are positive. Each of these relate directly to one of the areas of main con-
cern that I have expressed in the past about state voluntary cleanup prog-
rams: public participation, cleanup standards, and cleanup procedures.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the BRAC process and compare
it to the process for remediating abandoned or underused sites in state
brownfields programs. I find that while the two systems are different in
many significant respects, these differences do not overwhelm the com-
monalities inherent in comparing two systems that focus on remediating
sites and transferring them to their new owners. In Part II, I describe the
environmental remediation process of BRAC and positive "surprises" in
terms of the statutory preference for finality in remedial actions and for
public participation at sites being closed and the more mixed impact of
the evolution of BRAC to become more "brownfields-like."
I. COMPARING BRAC AND BROWNFIELDS PROCESSES
A. The BRAC Process
BRAC is the well known, high-profile effort where military
facilities deemed surplus are being closed ("C") or functionally realigned
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("R") by the Department of Defense ("DoD"). There have been five waves
(or "rounds," in military-speak) of BRAC: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and
2005. Nearly four hundred installations have been closed or realigned
since 1988, and the 2005 BRAC round is the most aggressive ever, con-
templating the closing of twenty-two major military installations in a
process lasting at least until the year 2011.1 Congressional enactments
governing the BRAC process include the Base Closure and Realignment
Act of 1988 (governing the BRAC 1988 round),2 the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990 (BRAC 1991, 1993, and 1995),3 and the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 and the subsequent BRAC
Commission report (BRAC 2005).'
A BRAC site can be the size of a small town or even larger: the
SouthField base in Massachusetts was once described as "bigger than
Boston";5 the Oakland Army Base occupied 364 acres in a dense urban set-
ting.6 The proposed closure of such facilities would have serious impacts on
local economies,7 not to mention the political future of elected officials
who dared to support closures.' For this reason, BRAC Congressional
'Donna Miles, BRAC Deadline Expires, DoD to Begin Closures, Realignments, AMER.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 2005, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?.id=18352.
2 Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 2749, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988).
3 Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1808 (1990); see also James W. Moeller, Arsenic
and an Old Base: Legal Issues Associated with the Environmental Restoration of Defense
Sites in Washington, D.C., Used for the Development and Disposal of World War I
Chemical Munitions, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 879, 894-96 (2005) (citations omitted).
4 Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1012 (2001); DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM'N,
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2005), available at httpJ/www.brac.gov/ finalreport.html.
'See David Hall, Senior Vice President, LNR Property Corp., Southfield: Redevelopment
of Former Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Remarks at Brownfields 2006 Conference:
Military Base Redevelopment: General and Major Issues, Strategies, and Successes
(Power Point presentation available at http://www.brownfields2008.org/proxy/Session
Document. 1847.aspx).
'California Department of Toxic Substances Control, Envirostor, Oakland Army Base,
www.envirostor.dtsc.ca.gov/public/profile-report.asp?global-id=01970006 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2008).
7 Base Closure and Community Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2901(2), 107 Stat.
1907 (1994) ("A military installation is a significant source of employment for many
communities, and the closure or realignment of an installation may cause economic
hardship for such communities."); see also INTERSTATE TECH. & REGULATORY COUNCIL,
PROPERTY REVITALIZATION-LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRAC AND BROWNFIELDS 25, 26
(2006) [hereinafter ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED], available at http://www.itrcweb.org/
Documents/Brnfld_2web.pdf.
'Childs Walker, Lawmakers Encourage Support for Base Plan, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24,
2005, available at www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/brac/bal-md.base24May24 ;0,7886244
.story?coll=bal-news localbrac-xpromo.
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enactments are the product of more horse-trading than perhaps any
other legislation save for appropriations bills. To bring independence to
the process, Congress created a mechanism that was intended to de-
politicize the process by way of transferring base closing decisions to
independent commissions.9 Of course, there are plenty who would argue
that the resulting decisions are still heavily influenced by politics and
not those of an independent process that examines each individual base
closing on its own merits.
The process by which a particular base makes it onto the BRAC
list, however, is not the focus of this Article, which takes it as a given
that a base has been selected for closure and transfer. Once that decision
has taken place, a rigorous multi-step process must be followed, in-
cluding an environmental remediation "track" governed by a variety of
Executive Orders and federal agency documents that interpret and guide
cleanups. As noted more fully below, cleanups at BRAC sites must follow
the mandates of state and federal environmental laws, including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), among others. °
The DoD's involvement in addressing environmental contamina-
tion at its facilities predates BRAC. In 1986, the Defense Environmental
Restoration Program ("DERP") was created for this purpose." Since
then, nearly 30,000 sites have been identified for investigation and pos-
sible remediation activities. 2 BRAC cleanups are but one aspect of the
DERP but a major one, responsible for about $300 to $600 million in
annual appropriations. 3
9 Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 201, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627 (1988) (establishing the Commission
on Base Realignment and Closure).1o See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL
(2006) [hereinafter BRRM], available at http'//www.defenselink.milbrac/pdf/ 4165-66-M-
BRRM-508.pdf.
" U.S. Department offDefense, History ofthe Defense Environmental Restoration Program,
httpsA/www.denix.osd.mil/denix/PublicLibrary/Cleanup/CleanupOfc/derp/history.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008); see also Moeller, supra note 3, at 886-93 (citations omitted).
12 Moeller, supra note 3, at 902.
'
3 DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
APPENDIX B: COMPONENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS PROGRESS: ARMY, NAVY, AI FORCE,




In 2006, the DoD issued a "Base Redevelopment and Realignment
Manual" ("BRRM"), a 146-page "cookbook" that prescribes BRAC pro-
cedures, including environmental remediation procedures. 14 A central
body in the BRAC process is the Local Redevelopment Authority ("LRA"),
an entity established by a state or local government, and recognized by
the DoD as responsible for developing the site's redevelopment plan and
potentially having a role in its implementation." The LRA "serves as the
primary link between DoD and the installation and the community and
Federal and State agencies for all base closure matters."16 The LRA's
reuse plan for the site to be transferred is intended to be a "reasonably
anticipated future land use . . taking into account factors such as the
current land use, zoning classifications and restrictions, property
characteristics, and surrounding land areas." 7 The site's future use, as
identified in the redevelopment plan, in turn helps with the identifica-
tion of the required cleanup level.
The method of disposing of BRAC surplus property is deter-
mined between the DoD and the LRA and can take one of many forms
listed in the BRRM "toolbox": public benefit conveyance, economic
development conveyance, public sale, negotiated sale, homeless assistance
conveyance under the McKinney Act, or an "environmental responsibili-
ties conveyance," which is an outright conveyance for the cost of
environmental remediation.lS
B. Differences Between BRAC and Brownfields Process
Forty-nine states have programs to promote revitalization of
"brownfields": "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."19 Many factors have
14 See generally BRRM, supra note 10.
15 "After redevelopment planning activities are completed, the LRA submits its adopted
redevelopment plan to the Military Department." Id. § C2.5.1.
16 Id. § 3.2.2.
17 ASS'N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS, A REGULATOR'S GUIDE
TO BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 13 (2006) [hereinafter ASTSWMO, BRAC
REGULATOR'S GUIDE], available at http://www.astswmo.org/files/publications/federal
facilities/Final-BRAC-Guide.pdf.
18 BRRM, supra note 10, §§ C2.6, C5.5.
'
9 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-118, § 211, 115 Stat. 2356, 2361 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2000
& Supp. IV 2004)).
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fueled an explosion in the number and size of brownfields programs over
the past two decades, including (at the outset in part) a response to the
fear of potential owner/operator liability under CERCLA and its state
counterparts for becoming associated with sites and a prevalent desire
to shift the enforcement model of environmental protection to being more
accommodating to those who sought to redevelop abandoned or neglected
sites. Today, many states have "voluntary cleanup programs" ("VCPs")
that allow site developers, who are usually not responsible for any
contamination at the site, to come voluntarily to the states and conduct
cleanups, receiving liability protection in return. Because state VCPs aim
to remediate sites with a more streamlined process, the cleanup is
typically meant to take less time and have fewer steps than the NCP
cleanup process.2 °
State brownfields programs have successfully processed thou-
sands of brownfields sites, and there are numerous high-profile stories
involving the conversion of abandoned or underused sites in urban, rural
and suburban locations to productive uses.2' At the federal level, one
commentator views the 2002 law promoting brownfields reuse and
remediation as a positive "exception" to the dismaying recent trend of
congressional inaction on environmental issues.22
Brownfields sites are typically different from BRAC sites, which
are identified as surplus in the BRAC process directed by the scheme
implemented by Congress. The highly politicized BRAC process yields a
prescribed list of sites that become identified for closure and transfer to
private sector entities. By contrast, some brownfields sites are identified
through centralized processes such as inventories (for example, the New
Jersey SiteMart),2" but usually the site buyer, developer, or local govern-
ment identifies the site. BRAC sites are, by definition, always owned by
the federal government and have usually had multiple uses as military
uses of a base changed.24 Often the owner of a brownfields site is not
known; in many cases there is no current owner (like "orphan sites" in
CERCLA parlance) and cleanup and transfer responsibility may fall to
20 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 25-26.
21 See generally Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 721 (2007) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields at 201.
22 Richard Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 629 (2006).
23 State of New Jersey, Brownfields Site Mart, http://www.njsitemart.com (last visited
Jan. 10, 2008); see also Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 729.
24 ITRC, LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 7, at 64.
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a local government.25 In the case of both types of sites, though, there is
one similarity in that historical records are often incomplete.2 6
The level and types of contaminants are also typically different.
Contamination at BRAC sites depends on how the military used the
sites and can include such widely diverse and dangerous substances as
metals, chlorinated solvents, organic chemicals, unexploded ordnance,
and even radioactive wastes.27 Contamination of soil, groundwater,
surface water, and sediments may be so widespread and severe that the
site may be listed on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). By contrast,
under state VCP restrictions, sites typically are not extensively contami-
nated and usually cannot be listed on the NPL or comparable state
enforcement site lists.
28
Another difference between the two programs is in the level and
type of regulatory oversight. One commentator observes that "the regu-
latory oversight process at a BRAC site can be quite different from that
at a private brownfield site."29 BRAC sites, by law, have multiple state
and federal agencies overseeing the cleanup. While the DoD has been
given the authority to lead cleanups at BRAC sites, other agencies, in-
cluding the EPA, are involved.3" Remediation at brownfields sites, by
contrast, is typically overseen by one state agency, or even none at all in
those states that allow consultant-led cleanups."
Given all these differences, one might wonder why our panel's
discussion of brownfields and BRAC was so harmonious. The answer is
not difficult to discern. The BRAC process has a number of safeguards in
place with respect to public participation, cleanup standards, and cleanup
oversight. However imperfect these safeguards might be (and no one
would argue that BRAC cleanups have been perfect), they are intended to
ensure that cleanups of sites being transferred are sufficiently protective
of those who will use the sites in the future.
25/d.
26 Id. at 28, 64.
2 Id.; see also Carolyn M. White, Senior Envtl. Counsel, Air Force Office of General
Counsel, Environmental Considerations in Real Property Transactions, Presentation at
the William & Mary Envtl. Law and Pol'y Rev. Symposium: Mission Impossible?: The
Compatibility of Military and Environmental Goals 16 (Feb. 10, 2007) (notes on file with
author).
28 Id.
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From the perspective of an observer and frequent critic of
brownfields programs, much of what is built formally into the BRAC pro-
gram seemed appealing. I have written about drawbacks of brownfields
programs in three areas: the lack of public participation in fundamental
decisions affecting the future of individual brownfields sites and
community land use planning generally; the relaxation of cleanup stan-
dards in the name of getting sites back into commerce more quickly; and
the relative lack of oversight in state VCPs. 32 By contrast, as I describe
below, BRAC's environmental safeguards often look more desirable than
those of state VCPs. At times, I was surprised to find that they even
compare favorably to substantive features I have recommended that
states incorporate in their brownfield programs.33
That, I suppose, was what led friends and colleagues familiar with
my work to suggest that I look to BRAC for exemplars of what might
work elsewhere. This leads us to a sort of irony, though. As I have come
to realize that BRAC might offer constructive lessons for those adminis-
tering state VCPs, the nature of BRAC environmental remediation itself
is changing. Over the course of the five BRAC rounds, and particularly
in the fifth round of closings, the BRAC process has moved to become
more "brownfields-like. 34 The process has begun to adopt the flexibility
and methodologies ofVCPs, to the extent practicable within the statutory
and regulatory framework that governs BRAC. According to a number of
commentators, this creates opportunities for getting sites back into
commerce more quickly than has been the case in the first four BRAC
rounds. If a cleanup at a BRAC site is administered with a major role
played by a state agency, it is not much different conceptually from a clean-
up at a private site remediated in a state VCP.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN BRAC AND THE THREE
"SURPRISES"
So while I found the surprises of looking at BRAC to be mostly
positive, I also found that the fifth BRAC round might pose the same
sorts of dilemmas that have been present in brownfields remediation and
32 See generally Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21; see also Joel B. Eisen,
Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 187 (1998)
[hereinafter Eisen, Sustainable Cities].
" See Eisen, Sustainable Cities, supra note 32, at 215-19.
3 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 1-2; U.S. Air Force BRAC Q&A, http://www
.af.mil/brac/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
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reuse since the 1990s. That contrapuntal thinking about the evolution of
BRAC led me to split my analysis of its features into two parts. In
sections A and B of this Part, I examine two largely positive attributes
of BRAC: its insistence on comprehensive remedial action and its
structure emphasizing public participation. In section C, I offer a pre-
liminary analysis of the increased use of more "brownfields-like" cleanup
procedures in BRAC and consider this to be a more mixed development.
A. "Clean Means Clean"
A definite positive surprise in the BRAC program is that at BRAC
sites there is a preference for finality of remedial action. The touchstone
for a BRAC cleanup is the statutory commitment embodied in CERCLA
§ 120(h), where "clean means clean," with strong coordinated multi-
jurisdictional and multi-agency oversight to ensure proper cleanup. In
particular, CERCLA § 120(h)(3) requires the DoD to ensure that "all
remedial action necessary to protect human health and the environment
with respect to any [hazardous] substance remaining on the property has
been taken before the date of such transfer."35 The deed transferring title
is required to list hazardous substances that were present on the
property and remedial actions (if any) taken to address them.3' The
BRRM states that "[wihenever a Military Department enters into a
transfer of real property outside the Federal government where CERCLA
120(h)(3) . . . hazardous substances were stored for 1 year or longer,
known to have been released, or disposed of, Section 120(h) of CERCLA
... applies, [and that,] "[tihe Department of Defense has no authority
under Section 120(h)... to increase or decrease the commitment required
by that section."3 v
If remediation activities are required, the statutory commitment
to cleanup leads the DoD to follow a rigorous process for investigation
and cleanup whether or not the site is listed on the NPL, as described in
the BRRM.3" As one commentator notes, "the structure and process set
forth in the NCP for environmental remediation are applicable to all
DERP sites regardless of NPL status."3" The cleanup process follows the
35 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
36 White, supra note 27, at 18.
3' BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.2.1.
38 See id. § C8.5.4.
" Moeller, supra note 3, at 910.
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normal multi-step process, that is, from Preliminary Assessment/Site
Inspection through Record of Decision, for cleanups conducted under the
NCP (or under RCRA procedures if appropriate, as spelled out in the
BRRM).4 ° In contrast to the normal process for privately-owned sites
being remediated under CERCLA, the DoD (not the EPA or a state environ-
mental agency) has lead authority under Executive Order 12,580 to conduct
the cleanup of a BRAC site, with the EPA's signoff required on selection
of remedies for those BRAC sites that are also on the NPL.41 The cleanup
is conducted in accordance not only with CERCLA or RCRA, but also
with a whole host of other state and federal environmental laws.
In a "standard" transfer all remediation activities are completed
prior to the transfer of the military facility to the private sector. The deed
must contain a covenant that "all remedial action necessary to protect
human health and the environment.., has been taken [prior to] transfer,"
and a covenant that any additional remedial action found to be necessary
after transfer will be conducted by the federal government.43 As one
commentator notes, this shows that "Congress did not want the federal
government to offload the costs of addressing contamination for which it
was responsible onto private parties that may not have the resources to
undertake proper cleanup."'
In the fifth BRAC round, the baseline report on existing environ-
mental conditions at a particular site is an "Environmental Condition of
Property" ("ECP") report which includes data on the environmental
history of the facility.45 As the BRRM states, "[t]he Military Department
4See BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.2.3.
41Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 29, 1987); White, supra note 27, at 16.
42 Exec. Order No. 12,580. Federal environmental laws governing the transfer of military
sites to private parties include the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the
National Historic Preservation Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and Endangered
Species Act, among others. BRRM, supra note 10 §§ C8.2, C8.4; White, supra note 27, at
14. NEPA compliance is a key component of the BRAC process, as spelled out in the
BRRM. BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.2. A table summarizing the various laws that govern
cleanups may be found in ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 25-28.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2000); see also White, supra note 27, at 18.
4 Goodwin Proctor LLP, Next Round of Base Closures Offers New Brownfield
Redevelopment Opportunities, ENVTL. L. ADvISORY 4, Aug. 2004, available at www
.goodwinprocter.com/-/media/FAODC812A12F4D2F9DB7185BE 1572AB2.ashx.45 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3; ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17,
at 6. While the ECP is not intended to meet the requirements of the "All Appropriate
Inquiries" rule detailing what purchasers of real property must do to avert potential
liability under CERCLA, it is meant to "[a] ssist prospective new owners in meeting the
[rule's] requirements." BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3.1.6.
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with real property accountability shall assess, determine, and document
the environmental condition of all transferable property in an ECP
report."46 There are multiple purposes of the ECP report, including
"[p]rovid[ing] the Military Department with information it may use to make
disposal decisions regarding the property" and "[p]rovid[ing] the public
with information relative to the environmental condition of the property.
4 7
The BRRM outlines the steps in the BRAC cleanup process from
that point forward. As in the case of private sector sites investigated
under CERCLA, it may be the case that no further action is required, or
it may be that a cleanup may be required, depending on the site's
condition.48 In the first four BRAC rounds, most cleanups were led by
BRAC Cleanup Teams ("BCTs") consisting of EPA, DoD and state
officials, 49 but the leadership team structure has been modified for the
fifth BRAC round.5"
Both the EPA and the DoD have responsibilities for specific
remediation activities.51 A detailed Memorandum of Understanding
between the EPA and the DoD spells out the responsibilities of each for
BRAC site cleanups.52 One EPA task, besides signoff on remedies for
BRAC sites also on the NPL, is "[clertifying that remedies are working
as they were intended at all sites when remedial actions are complete
(known as 'operating properly and successfully')."" This "OPS demon-
stration," meets the requirements of CERCLA § 120(h)(3) "if the
4' BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3.1.
47 Id. §§ C8.3.1.1, C8.3.1.2.
48 Id. § C8.5.4.49 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 13.
50 Id. ("According to the BRRM, BCTs will not be created at the BRAC 2005 installations.
At many installations, working relationships are already established between DoD
personnel and federal and State regulators. This is the case at facilities where the EPA
Remedial Project Manager, DoD personnel and state personnel already work together on
cleanup decisions. Section [018.5.6 of the BRRM states, 'Existing procedures and
relationships related to regulatory oversight should be maintained for closing installations
when they facilitate cleanup and redevelopment, and until the property is transferred to
the new owner.' These working relationships do facilitate cleanup, and therefore should
continue throughout the BRAC process to address cleanup and property transfer issues.").
51 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, Property
Transfer at Federal Facilities, available at http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/pdf/baseclosure.pdf.
52 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Dep't of Defense, Memorandum of Understanding
Between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense,
EPA Reference PW97922127-01-0, (2005), available at http'J/www.epa.gov/fedfac/pdf/
bracmou.pdf.
53 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Property Transfer at Federal Facilities, supra note 51, at 3.
41320081
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
construction and installation of an approved remedial design has been
completed, and the remedy has been demonstrated to the [EPA]
Administrator to be operating properly and successfully." 4 The EPA's
approval of an OPS demonstration does not imply that all remedial action
has been completed, but only that transfer may take place, for the
completion of remedial activities "is defined by the attainment of specific
cleanup levels or performance goals that are specified in a decision
document, such as a ROD."55
An important step in the transfer or lease of a BRAC site is a
Finding of Suitability to Transfer (or Lease) ("FOST" or "FOSL"). This
document, prepared at the conclusion of the process, "state[s] the
property is environmentally suitable for transfer or lease and contain [s]
a description of any long-term remedies (including land-use controls) and
responsibilities for their maintenance and reporting."56 This document
certifies that CERCLA § 120(h)(3) has been complied with and that all
remedial actions have been taken, the CERCLA covenants have been
met, and the property is suitable for transfer or lease. 7
A new mechanism allows so-called "early transfer," or a transfer
before all remedial activities are completed.' In that case the DoD prepares
a Covenant Deferral Request/Finding of Suitability for Early Transfer
("FOSET"): request for early transfer, under CERCLA § 120(h)(3) as
amended. 9 This will be covered in more detail below, as it is a critical
element of BRAC's transformation into a more "brownfields-like" system.
As the BRAC cleanup and transfer process is spelled out in this
comprehensive fashion in the BRRM, following the mandates of existing
state and federal environmental laws, there is a resulting relative
uniformity in the cleanup approach. What is also familiar, then, are the
imperfections that have dogged the CERCLA cleanup process at private
sector sites since the advent of CERCLA, including delays and cost
overruns.6 ° Cleanups can be delayed, particularly at BRAC NPL sites,
5 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(B) (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ETAL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL
SITE CLOSEOUT PROCESS GUIDE § 6.1 (1999) thereinafter DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE],
available at http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/pdf/site.closeout.pdf.
55 DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE, supra note 54, § 6.1.
56 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.5.1.
57/d.
.
5 8Id. § C5.6.3.1.
59 Id. § C5.5.5.3.
60 ASS'N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS, POLICY POSITION PAPER
ON TH MILITARYBASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 19,2006) [hereinafter
ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER], available at http://www.astswmo.orgfiles/publications/
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and a recent analysis by the EPA's Office of Federal Facilities Restora-
tion and Reuse notes that thirty-four sites are still on the NPL.61
The remediation process compares favorably to that of state VCPs
in that it retains a commitment to full cleanups. As the BRAC process
becomes more "brownfields-like," this may be a difference without a
distinction, but at least in its statutory and regulatory machinery BRAC
requires a more thorough remediation process than does the typical state
VCP. The formal commitment, however, may not be all that important,
as borne out by BRAC cleanups that fall short of the ideal. As the
Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials
("ASTSWMO") notes, the "DoD has shown an increased reliance on
institutional controls as the primary remedy or as a major component in
the overall remedies at BRAC sites," and while "[ilnstitutional controls
are initially lower in cost as compared to more permanent remedies...
[they] should not be the sole component of any final remedy."62 The
ASTSWMO cautions that "[s]tate experiences with institutional controls
suggest that permanent remedies are more effective and potentially less
expensive over time than high maintenance remedies based predomi-
nantly on institutional controls."63
There is another respect in which the BRAC process can inform
the state brownfields process: through its feature of a post-cleanup
obligation. The DoD is required under CERCLA to perform more cleanup
than was completed before the transfer of the site when additional
contamination is discovered, when the selected remedy failed to perform
as expected, or when an institutional control proved ineffective.64
Unfortunately, this may not be the panacea for remedying problems that
are not addressed in the initial remediation process. As one commentator
notes, "under a worst-case scenario, it may be difficult to make the DoD
component return to complete remediation where they are no longer
owners [of sites]. "6
However effective the post-cleanup obligation might be, it stands
in contrast to the situation in state VCPs, where there is typically no
federalfacilities/Final%20April%202006%20BRAC%20position%20paper.pdf.
61 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, Mid-Year
2007 BRAC Program Snapshot, http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/brac2007.htm#5
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008).62 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 5.
63 id.
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(iii) (2000).
65ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 24.
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such requirement. Indeed, more than one commentator has suggested
that a drawback of VCPs is their insufficient attention to the future.66
With states strapped for resources to oversee ongoing cleanups, it is
unlikely that they would devote much vigor to checking back on those
sites which have already had what the states believed were successful
outcomes. This may turn out to be unsound, as the cleanup at a brownfields
site may fall short if all existing contamination at sites was not discov-
ered prior to their reuse (particularly if a developer uses institutional
controls rather than performing a cleanup), or if sites that have been
processed through the programs are contaminated again at a later date.
Neither situation is typically addressed in state VCPs. Most state laws
have "reopener" features but evidence to date suggests that states do not
use them to perform oversight of sites that have been processed through
the programs.67
B. A Model of Public Participation?
In the early 1990s, when I began writing about brownfields law
and policy, some well-meaning friends and colleagues suggested that I
look to base closings as a model. At first, I was taken aback by the unusual
notion that any military process could stand as a model of public partici-
pation. And yet, it turns out that a vital component of DoD cleanup
activities at BRAC sites is coordination with local stakeholders. The
primary vehicle for this is the Restoration Advisory Board ("RAB"),
combined with the availability of funds for training local residents to
become active public participants under contracts from the Technical
Assistance for Public Participation ("TAPP") program.6" The purpose of
TAPP is to provide "support for independent technical advice to assist in
clarifying specific scientific and engineering issues that arise when review-
ing restoration activities and documents."69 There is nothing comparable
in most state VCPs to help ordinary citizens understand the complexities
of environmental remediation.
' See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 732 (citing Professor David Dana).67 Id. at 746.
68 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM FISCALYEAR
2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS App. 0, 0-6 [hereinafter DOD, DERP ANNUAL
REPORT 2006], available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/OSD/DEP2006/
App_0_Restoration-Advisory-Boardsosd-draft.pdf. Appendix 0 details the TAPP process
and provides a list of groups receiving TAPP grants.69 Id.
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As the name implies, the RAB is an entity formed to advise the
DoD on decisions involving the closing and transfer of the facility and is
meant to be a "continuous forum through which members of affected com-
munities can provide input to an installation's ongoing environmental
restoration activities." ° The RAB is established under statutes and
regulations governing the BRAC process.7 The DoD rule, last updated
in 2006,72 spells out the circumstances under which a RAB should be
established. The rule states that "[a] RAB should be established when
there is "sufficient and sustained community interest," and any of the fol-
lowing conditions are met: "(1) [tlhe closure of the facility [with] a transfer
of property to the community, (2) [alt least 50 local citizens petition...
[the facility to create a RAB], (3) [flederal, state, tribal, or local govern-
ment representatives request... [it], or (4) the installation determines the
need for RAB." Once a RAB is established, it usually includes represen-
tatives of the facility, local governments, the EPA, and citizens.7 4 Its
proceedings are open to the public, with the facility maintaining an
Administrative Record for public review.75
There have been some disagreements in situations where commu-
nity members thought RABs should have been established but were not.
This led some commentators to the 2006 RAB rule update to observe that
requiring fifty citizens to petition for a RAB was an onerous burden.7 6
The DoD disagreed and maintained the requirement as is.77 In any event,
the situation where residents seek to have a RAB but are rebuffed is the
exception, not the rule, as there are about 310 RABs in operation.78
7 0 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17. See also BRRM, supra
note 10, § C8.5.1.5 ("RABs bring together people who reflect the diverse interests within
the local community, enabling the early and continued flow of information among the
affected community, DoD, and environmental oversight agencies.").
71 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)(2)(A) (2000).
72 Department of Defense Restoration Advisory Boards, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,610 (May 12,
2006) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2006)). A number of lingering issues were addressed
in the 2006 rule update, including criteria for establishment of a RAB, its composition,
and logistics (meetings, adjournment, etc.). Id.
73 32 C.F.R. § 202.2(a) (2006).741 Id. § 202.4(a).
75 Id. §§ 202.9(a), 202.11, 202.14.
76 See 71 Fed. Reg. at 27,612.77 Id. ("The Department clarifies that 50 petitioners is not the only way to establish a RAB.
The petition is one of four proposed mechanisms to initiate the establishment of the RAB.").
76 DoD, DERP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 68, at 0-2; ASTSWMO, BRAC
REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17.
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RABs have added value to the BRAC process. A survey conducted
by ASTSWMO found that twenty-nine out of thirty-one state environ-
mental agencies viewed RABs as a positive influence.7" In this respect,
the BRAC process compares quite favorably to public participation in state
VCPs. In the two decades since the advent of state brownfields programs,
there has been a substantial shift in the level of public participation in
remediation and reuse decisions.8 0 Many statutes enacted in what one
might term the "first generation" of brownfields laws did not establish
mandatory requirements to involve the public in such basic decisions as
determining the future uses to which sites would be put, preferring
instead to leave these decisions within developers' control.81 One apparent
reason for this was that states intended to signal that developers who vol-
unteered to remediate and reuse sites should face less bureaucratic red
tape than if they were enmeshed in enforcement-driven situations. Since
then, developers who are dotting the i's and crossing the t's do more to
involve the public, often more than is required under state VCP procedures.
However, there are still fundamental differences between public
input in state VCPs and BRAC. First is the requirement that an advisory
board be formed when citizens request it. This concept is not completely
absent from state VCPs, as some states do have mechanisms for forming
advisory board-like structures to advise site developers and state regulators
(and some boards are of course formed on an ad hoc basis). Still, the
majority of states do not require developers to consult with community-
based entities.8 Also, the requirement that the military give "careful
consideration" to the advice of RABs (which may include recommenda-
tions on the future use of a military facility) 3 is unheard of in state
VCPs, where the site developers typically come to the states after having
developed their plans for the sites. 4 This is an important distinction
between the two types of programs. Local residents naturally expect that
their input will drive decisions about site use, and are often surprised to
" Ass'n of State & Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt. Officials, Community Involvement:
Working Together to Achieve Results (2007), available at http://www.astswmo.org/files/
publications/federalfacilities/CommunityInvolvementWebversion.pdf.
80 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 753.
81 See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?": Challenges and Limits of
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883 (1996) [hereinafter
Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?'1.
82 Id. at 1004-05.
83 32 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(3) (2006).
84 See Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?", supra note 81, at 1003-04.
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find out that most VCPs do not give them a voice in this critical aspect
of the process. By contrast, the DoD's report on RABs notes that over one
hundred RABs advised the military on the future use of BRAC sites."s
Local residents are almost always represented on RABs.s" So too
are residents of the affected base, local environmental groups, members
of the local business community, low-income and minority groups, and
local government officials. 7 This broad-based participation is a signifi-
cant factor in the appeal of RABs as community sounding boards. As the
ASTSWMO has found, "since the inception of the BRAC program, DoD's
emphasis on stakeholder involvement through the formation of BCTs
and RABs has generally been successful and has contributed to expedit-
ing environmental cleanups and helped build community support for the
BRAC process.""8
There simply is no comparable requirement in state VCP pro-
cedures to draw upon advice from a broad spectrum of the affected
community. If the states established boards of this sort at brownfields
sites, particularly larger sites that have impacts on entire communities,
the resulting decision making might be more in keeping with community
visions for urban redevelopment. That in turn, as I have stated elsewhere,
is an essential element in achieving sustainability through brownfields
reuse and redevelopment.8 9 This is no doubt a positive surprise emerging
from the comparison between public participation in BRAC and state VCPs.
C. The Process Is Becoming More "Brownfields-Like" (Increasing
Flexibility in Cleanups Through the Use of ETA)
While the BRAC process has been a highly competent means of
balancing private sector interests and environmental protection, BRAC
cleanups in the fifth round are evolving and becoming more "brownfields-
like," with developers seeking cleanup processes that have more of the
perceived flexibility inherent in VCPs. As the ASTSWMO notes, "[it is
anticipated that early transfer/privatization of contaminated parcels will
85 DOD, DERP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 68, at 0-6.
86 Id. at 0-5 (305 out of 312 RABs in FY 2006 reported having members from the local
community and even the other seven might have local residents because they could be
counted in other categories).
7 Id. (citing Figure 0-8).
88 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1.
89 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 753-55 (citations omitted); Eisen,
Sustainable Cities, supra note 32.
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be the norm as DoD attempts to quickly transfer BRAC properties."9"
This final "surprise" is a more mixed one in its potential impacts for
environmental protection.
Since its enactment, CERCLA §120(h)(3) has been amended to
allow early transfer of a BRAC site under certain circumstances before
all required remedial action has been completed, under the process
known as "Early Transfer Authority."9 Under early transfer agreements
("ETA"), the statutory mandate for a complete cleanup remains but the
private sector takes on more responsibility for remediation activities
(particularly in a transferee-led cleanup).92 CERCLA § 120(h)(3)(C)
allows federal agencies to transfer property before all necessary cleanup
actions have been taken.93 The ETA is a deferral of the CERCLA covenants,
and the Covenant Deferral Request/ Finding of Suitability for Early
Transfer ("FOSET") requires approval from the EPA and from state
governmental authorities.' The DoD is still required to issue the covenant
required under CERCLA that "all remedial action [s] necessary to protect
human health and the environment... [have] been taken," but in an early
transfer situation the timing of issuance of this covenant changes.95
ETA has been used at a small minority of BRAC sites to date.96 In
the standard cleanup and transfer model, as noted above, the DoD does
the cleanup itself under the procedures spelled out in the NCP.97 In the
ETA model, options for cleanup activities can be selected in part on the
basis of which party is best qualified to perform them.9" The model can
be more like the standard transfer, with the DoD performing cleanup
work and the transferee focusing on redevelopment activities, or the DoD
and transferee can share cleanup work.99 At the cleanup of the Mare
Island Naval Shipyard in California, for example, the DoD focused on
90 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1.
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C) (2000).92 See BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C).
94 See BRRM, supra note 10, § C5.5.5.3.
95 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I).
96 See Victor Wieszek, Office of the Deputy Under Sec'y of Def., Early Transfer Authority:
Background and Use for BRAC Rounds I-V, Remarks at the Joint Services Environmental
Management Conference and Exhibition 7 (Mar. 2006) (Power Point presentation
available at httpJ/ proceedings.ndia.org/JSEM2006/Wednesday/Wieszek.pdf (noting that
ETA has been used at twenty-one BRAC sites).





military-specific cleanup issues and left addressing other contamina-
tion in the hands of the LRA.1 °°
In a purely privatized cleanup, the DoD would transfer title early
to the LRA, before any cleanup activities had been completed. 11 According
to the ASTSWMO, it "can be a very successful tool to transfer property
because it accelerates remediation, and advances economic development of
an area. It also removes the DoD component as an impediment to cleanup
to state standards, because the new owner agrees, in the Consent
Agreement, to cleanup to state standards."0 2 This recognizes that the
private party may do cleanup more efficiently than the government, as
it might have more expertise in environmental remediation, and could
retain its own remediation contractor and have more control over the
process. The LRA may have an existing relationship with state regula-
tors, which may in theory help move the remediation activities along
more expeditiously."13 Perhaps the most important reason advanced for
privatized transfers is the "one dig" principle: integrating cleanup and
redevelopment would allow the LRA to perform all of this work at the
site at the same time.
10 4
A notable example of a site that has proceeded to cleanup and
reuse under a privatization model is the Oakland Army Base in Oakland,
California.' This base was located on the Oakland waterfront just south
of the eastern entrance to the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Accord-
ing to a historical source, "[i]ts mission was to ship the Army's men and
material into the Pacific areas of operation [in World War II and diuring
the war tens of thousands of soldiers and 25 million tons of supplies
'0o See U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AT FORMER
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD (2006), available at http://deparc.egovservices.net/deparc/
pdfs/storieslNavy/BRACMareIslandNavySuccessStory_10-16-06.pdf (providing a
detailed description of Mare Island cleanup activities); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 1998 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS app. A, at 124, available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/PubliclLibrary/
Cleanup/CleanupOfc/arc/Reports/FY1998/app.a/marei_124.pdf (providing a timeline of
the cleanup at Mare Island).01 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 20.
102 Id. at 24.
'03 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that one environmental consideration that
influences the merits of using ETA is the relationship between the LRA and state
environmental regulators).
'04 See ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 5; Wieszek, supra note 96, at 3.
105 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 9; City of Oakland, Site Information, Reports &
Analysis, httpJ/www.oaklandnet .conmgovermentlobra/hp.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
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flowed through this terminal."1°6 After World War II, it functioned as "a
major distribution point for war surplus material."' In 1995, it was
designated for closure in the fourth BRAC round.'
In 2000, the appropriate LRA, the "Oakland Base Reuse Author-
ity" ("OBRA"), requested a conveyance using the ETA procedure, so new
owners of the site could integrate cleanup and redevelopment. °9 The
OBRA developed a reuse plan in 2002 that involved dividing the site
between the Oakland Redevelopment Agency (which would receive a
conveyance from the OBRA) and the Port of Oakland."' The part of the
site deeded to the Redevelopment Agency would be turned into a
"Gateway Development Area.""' Under this reuse plan, the Army trans-
ferred 364 acres of base property to the City of Oakland in August 2003.112
The California Department of Toxic Substances Control is the lead
agency for base environmental restoration." 3 Cleanup is taking place
under a Remedial Action Plan ("RAP") and Risk Management Plan
("RMP"), as specified in California's brownfields laws, with site cleanups
to be completed within five years of the transfer (that is, by 2008). 114 The
Army retained a small parcel of about thirteen acres that was intended
for transfer to the Department of Interior for use as a park." 5
The Oakland Army Base transfer has been described as an
"[i]nnovative application of brownfield redevelopment approach at a
closed military facility [and the flirst of its kind for the U.S. Army BRAC
" California State Military Museum, Oakland Army Base, http/www.militarymuseum .org/
OaklandArmyBase.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FINDING OF SUITABILITY FOR EARLY TRANSFER FOR OAKLAND
ARMY BASE 8 (2003), available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/obra/foset
FOSET-FINALSIGNEDAPR-03.pdf.
110 OAKLAND BASE REUSE AUTHORITY, OAKLAND ARMY BASE FINAL REUSE PLAN 2 (2002),
available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/obra/obrafrp.pdf.
'11 Id. at 3.
112 California Department of Toxic Substances Control, supra note 6.
113 Id.
114 See id.; OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE
STUDY: OAKLAND ARMY BASE-REMEDIATION AND REUSE 16 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE STUDY], available at http://www.oea.gov/oeaweb.nsf/
Clough.pdf.
1'5 See ERLER & KALINOWSKI, INC., DRAFT REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN FOR OAKLAND ARMY
BASE 1-2, available at httpJ/www.oaklandnet.comgovernment/ceda/revised/planningzoning/
MajorProjectsSection/RAP/Text/Text.pdf; California Department of Toxic Substances
Control, supra note 6.
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Program." '116 One commentator identifies two significant benefits from the
early transfer through use of a FOSET and remedial action in California's
state brownfields program: (1) "[a] [cilose working relationship with
DTSC staff-[i]ncluding jointly edited documents and working group
sessions[; and (2)] [i]ncorporation of significant local community support
for brownfield redevelopment under the City of Oakland's Urban Land
Redevelopment Program."117 This suggests that the purported administra-
tive efficiencies of remediating BRAC sites under the auspices of a state
program may in fact have been present in this case.
Yet, overall, there have been relatively few privatized cleanups to
date, reflecting the complexity of handing off remediation activities while
ensuring that the CERCLA covenants will be met.' As has been noted,
"[sluccessful implementation of [ETA] requires that the DoD, the pur-
chaser, the community, and the regulatory agencies work very closely
together. Not only is this partnership in the spirit of the BRAC process,
but it is mandated by statute.""9
As the trend toward privatization is likely to continue 120 it is
worth paying attention to its potential environmental consequences.
Because the process would devolve considerable responsibility for cleanups
to the private sector, with oversight by the states, it is subject to the
same drawbacks that I have identified previously with state VCPs. As
with VCPs, the end result will require vigilance by state agencies that
they may not be fully equipped to carry out. The ASTSWMO cautions
that "Itihis [privatization] approach will directly impact State regulatory
agencies, as it will require additional oversight and State resources."'21
This could lead to problems in the long run if, as I have observed else-
where,122 states tend to devote fewer resources to their brownfields programs
than might be necessary to ensure that cleanups remain protective after
they are completed.
116 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE STUDY, supra note 114, at 19.
117 Id. at 20.
118 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that "ETA is not appropriate for all
properties" and listing considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether to use
the authority).
119 DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE, supra note 54, § 6.2.
120 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 1 ("BRAC 2005 cleanups
will be more focused toward privatization and Performance Based Contracts, which likely
means additional State regulatory oversight.").
121 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1.
122 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 735-37 (citations omitted).
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More specifically, some substantive concerns would linger. If a
cleanup is done assuming land uses as specified in the LRA's land use
plan, there should be some assurance that additional remediation will
take place if land uses change over time. As the ASTSWMO states, "[a
BRACI clean up to restricted use must include the future liabilities...
should land use change." 123 But that sort of long-run vigilance is not a
strong suit of state brownfields programs at present, nor, for that matter,
is long-term monitoring to ensure that land use controls are appropri-
ately working. 2 4 In the words of one observer, "any policy that supports
restricted uses must also address the full range of issues involving land
use controls including the implementability and enforceability of [land
use controls]."12 Again, leaving that in the hands of state brownfields
programs makes an assumption about long-term efficacy that has yet to
be proven.1
26
Another potential problem inheres in the notion that in a
privatized cleanup the new property owner might take on the cleanup
actions, but in the final instance "CERCLA liability remains with DoD
[and a]reas of additional contamination discovered after the property
transfer would still be the responsibility of DoD." 2' Unfortunately, this re-
opener (the same one based on CERCLA § 120(h)(3) as discussed above)
may be even less useful than it would be in "standard" cleanups and trans-
fers, as one commentator notes that "[tihe downside is that the DoD
component is no longer the owner of the property." 28 This would make
it especially difficult to make the DoD return to the site and either super-
vise or conduct additional remedial activities, as the military would no
longer have ownership of the property.
129
So privatization may be the frontier of BRAC cleanups, but for me
it raises many of the same red flags as do brownfields cleanups. Brown-
fields cleanups are here to stay, of course, so it is no surprise that the
BRAC process is moving in this direction. It is too soon, however, to tell
whether BRAC sites will turn out to be just like other brownfields sites,
and any thoughts I might have about that (besides the programmatic
concerns I have expressed about state VCPs generally) would be
123 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17.
124 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 735-37 (citations omitted).
125 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17.
126 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 735-37 (citations omitted).
127 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGUIATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 21.




conjectural at this point. Still, I wonder, given the larger size and
complexity of the typical BRAC site compared to brownfields sites, if the
potential problems might even be exacerbated. Time will tell, and so at
this point I am wary and can only view this "surprise" (the trend toward
increased privatization) as a mixed blessing.
CONCLUSION
The "surprise" of our panel presentation was that the BRAC
process, with its complex mechanisms for environmental remediation,
can offer lessons for state brownfields officials in the critical areas of
public participation and cleanup process and oversight. Because many
BRAC sites are complex and have required considerable effort by a
number of stakeholders working together to achieve effective environ-
mental remediation, there is a lengthy track record that may not always
adhere to the statutory and regulatory ideals. Nevertheless, it can be
said that BRAC cleanups at least strive toward an ideal that is not
required in any state VCP.
At the same time, though, as BRAC cleanups are becoming more
state VCP-like (that is, with more use of ETA and "brownfields-like"
methods), challenges about finality of remedial action and long-run
oversight will enter more into the BRAC process. We will have to revisit
this evolution of the BRAC process in its fifth round as sites are being
remediated and transferred to the private sector, and, in particular, we
will have to monitor whether state regulators devote the resources
necessary to ensure that the sites being transferred are completely safe.
Although it is too soon to tell whether this experimentation will yield
productive results, it is almost certain to lead to a different model of
interaction between the military and the private sector, one which bears
watching in the future.
2008] 425
